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What does it mean for something to be legitimate? Although the idea of legitimacy is 
commonplace and political philosophy takes state legitimacy in particular as one of its 
central concerns, the concept of legitimacy has received little attention. In this article I 
propose a new understanding of the concept of legitimacy (LEGITIMACY).1 
I begin by explaining a function that we need a concept to serve in social practices 
(Chalmers 2011). This is the function of identifying entities that we should treat as belonging 
to the practice and appropriately orienting our actions towards them. I call this the 
‘gatekeeping’ function. Following the suggestive work of Buchanan (2013) on political 
legitimacy, I argue that LEGITIMACY serves the gatekeeping function. My proposal then shapes 
the concept so that it can perform the gatekeeping function well. 
It makes sense that not much theoretical attention has been paid to LEGITIMACY if it is 
a gatekeeping concept: gatekeeping is only important insofar as the gated practice is 
important. It is natural to focus our theoretical and practical attention on the ultimate goals 
and values of the practice and not the merely enabling conditions. However, as I explain 
below, no practice can function without performing this gatekeeping function. 
Understanding it helps us understand particular practices, some of their faults, and the 
structure of social life more generally. 
The concise version of my proposal is that an entity is legitimate when it counts as an 
occupant of a particular role within a social practice and so has the associated normative 
status.2 If sufficient people use LEGITIMACY in this way and also accept the normativity of the 
practice in question, then their behavior will enable that practice to function. This proposal 
about the meaning of LEGITIMACY is therefore revisionist in nature. I do not claim that this is 
what we all mean right now each time we employ LEGITIMACY in our everyday language. 
Instead, my claim is that using LEGITIMACY in the way I propose would better serve its 
function. I take this to be a project of conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics (Burgess 
                                                                
1 Following a convention, terms in small caps refer to the concept itself. 
2 I use the neutral ‘entity’ to capture the range of things to which social practices assign roles 
(and status). The primary case is individuals but ‘entity’ also covers other agents (groups), 
mere subjects (dogs), objects (stop signs), events (recessions), ideas (theories) and actions 
(voting), among others. 
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and Plunkett 2013a; 2013b). That said, I also think that we often use LEGITIMACY in this way 
and that recognizing this would help clarify some substantive debates about legitimacy. 
Adopting my proposal would give our shared use and assessment of legitimacy claims 
more precise foundations. Our current usages of LEGITIMACY tend to be vague, 
interchangeable with other concepts like JUSTIFICATION, or underspecified. I take greater 
precision to be especially important for theorizing the legitimacy of increasingly varied 
entities. For example, state legitimacy has received immense amounts of theoretical 
attention but the contemporary shift to theorizing the legitimacy of international political 
institutions has been difficult. It is not clear whether LEGITIMACY means the same thing when 
applied to such institutions, whether they should have the same standards for legitimacy as 
nation-states, and so on. A more general understanding of LEGITIMACY helps us address such 
issues. 
Here’s the plan. In the first section I explain the gatekeeping function and why it is 
necessary for social practices. In section 2, I argue that LEGITIMACY plausibly serves the 
gatekeeping function and I consider some implications. In section 3, I apply my proposal to 
political legitimacy, arguing that it clarifies some disagreements about state legitimacy and 
some of the issues raised when we shift attention away from the state, to other kinds of 
political legitimacy. I conclude by addressing some potential concerns, including that 
LEGITIMACY means something much broader, akin to JUSTIFICATION. 
 
1. The Function 
 
We begin with an inquiry into a concept’s function. As Chalmers (2011: 538) puts it, ‘instead 
of asking “What is X?,” one should focus on the roles one wants X to play and see what can 
play that role.’ In the conceptual engineering project as I understand it, a concept’s function 
is its social function. It is based on questions such as, ‘If scientists used PISCIS specified in this 
way, would it advance scientific inquiry?’ or ‘If we used WOMAN specified in this way, would 
it help us address gender-based oppression?’ (Novaes 2018; Haslanger 2012). We want to 
know what the world looks like when a community takes up a shared meaning and employs 
the concept in a specified way or, as I will say, when it is used in a shared discourse. What 
good does it do a community to use this concept rather than getting along without it or using 
it in a different way (Williams 2002; Fricker 2007)?3  
The general function of normative concepts is to organize and direct our actions. 
Different normative concepts do so in different ways with respect to different domains. For 
example, Waldron (2003: 271) argues that ‘principles of justice have a specific role to play 
in social theory, which has to do with the distribution of individualized benefits and burdens.’ 
The domain of JUSTICE is the distribution of benefits and burdens. In the same vein, the 
                                                                
3 The community in question could be a technical community of experts or it could be 
broader publics. 
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domain of virtue and vice concepts is character traits, the domain of RIGHTS is deontological 
relations, and so on. A theory of LEGITIMACY should tell us the function it performs by 
explaining how it governs our actions and in what domain.  
I proceed in two stages. In this section I show that social practices need to perform 
the gatekeeping function, distinguishing role occupants from each other and from non-
occupants. I argue that this is done by the application of normative status through the 
creation and assignment of roles within the practice. In the next section, I argue that 
LEGITIMACY should serve this function. 
Our focus is on social practices in the broad sense of a regularized pattern of behavior 
that is the result of people conforming to behavioral standards or norms.4 Although details 
vary, starting from something like this broad sense of social practice or institution is 
commonplace (e.g. North 1991; Tuomela 2002; Searle 2010). Our concern is often for the 
patterned behavior but it will also help to consider sets of norms as potential, inchoate, or 
imperfectly realized social practices. 
Practices coordinate (in a non-technical sense) behavior by applying various norms 
to entities within the practice.5 Primary among these entities are persons who count as 
participants in the practice. When participants share a significantly overlapping sense of 
what the norms require of them and accept that they should abide by the norms, they will 
generally act according to the norms in similar ways. (Here I leave aside the question of why 
participants are motivated to follow the norm, which will widely vary, including internal 
acceptance of the norm and appreciation of external incentives.) The resultant consonant 
behavior characteristically aims at some goal or end. In this sense, social practices are 
teleological, although not in the sense of being intentionally created to pursue an end (Miller 
2010). 
The assignment of shared norms gives participants a common standard. Without 
shared norms, individual actions would be very unlikely to overlap in any interesting way; 
even if the actors all intentionally pursued a shared goal, conflicting individual judgments 
about how to proceed would lead towards haphazard and often contradictory behavior. The 
practice would not be able to succeed and, in a significant sense, would not exist without 
participants feeling bound by and sharing in an understanding of the relevant norms.  
The most basic practice might only distinguish between participants and non-
participants and may only direct participants to act in one way but most practices involve a 
variety of participant types that are assigned (and partly defined by) complex collections of 
                                                                
4 Participants may endorse the norms or simply believe that others endorse them (Bicchieri 
2016).  
5 Practices in my sense need not be collective or joint activity. Bathing is a social practice 
when people tend to agree and follow roughly the same cleanliness norms although the 
activity of bathing is mostly individual. Still, the outcome is roughly and non-technically 
coordinated levels of cleanliness. 
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norms. What I call an entity’s normative status is the complete set of norms that apply to it. 
Primary among these are the deontic incidents, including duties, claim-rights, and powers. 
Social practices function by assigning statuses to participants. 
The social practice of the university pursues its goal of advancing understanding by 
assigning a certain status to professors that gives them duties to teach classes, conduct 
research, evaluate students, and so on. It assigns a distinct but complementary status to 
students, who must attend class, submit work, and so on. In order to succeed, the practice 
must carefully define participants’ relations to one another and the participants must accept 
those norms as appropriate guides to their behavior. The same is true of book clubs and 
mosques and etiquette. Or consider a more informal practice like the nuclear family, with the 
roles of parent and child, each having its own kind of standing with respect to one another. 
In some versions, further distinctions among roles are made, for example between mother 
and father. Within the practice, entities (especially people) are assigned a status that defines 
how they relate to others. 
Most social practices function by having a diversity of statuses. Such diversity allows 
the assignment and coordination of distinct tasks and so division of labor. In some cases, 
such diversity of statuses is not only more efficient but conceptually necessary to achieve the 
goals of the practice. This might be because the good being pursued is necessarily social and 
relational in nature or because the task is beyond the scope of an individual’s capacities 
healthy. This characterization fits our more complex social practices but it may seem out of 
place for simpler ones. It may also seem out of place for more egalitarian practices, where 
part of the value is precisely that all participants have the same status. My local book club 
may have only one status, member, and we may all share equally in the responsibilities 
thereof. However, the single status still plays the critical function of distinguishing 
participants from non-participants. Without this distinction the practice will not be able to 
function. Even in the limit case where all persons or all considerable beings are assigned the 
same status, the practice will rely on distinguishing the considerable from the non-
considerable. Human social practices all rely on the distinctions between participant and 
non-participant. 
Social practices need to coordinate behavior in order to operate. But why think this 
can only be done by the assignment of status? This potential objection rests on a 
misunderstanding of status. No practice needs to use any specific terminology. The technical 
language of deontic incidents can more precisely characterize status but is ultimately only 
describing relationships between entities and the various ways they can interact within the 
practice. If a participant faces some choice and an option is not forbidden to them by the 
practice, it can be helpful to define that option precisely as a permission. The language 
describes the relationships; what social practices need to do is define (often not very 
precisely) those relationships.  
Perhaps the objection is not to the language being used but the very idea that the 
relationships need defining. Note that defining needn’t mean codifying; law is an extreme 
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example of explicit and written codification but many social practices rely on less formal 
ways of defining relationships within the practice. The relevant contrast case is a complete 
lack of shared understanding about how participants in the practice should act. The result of 
this will be failure to attain (or even pursue in any robust sense) the good in question. This 
is because, as noted above, people will act in contradictory, undermining, irrelevant ways 
without their relations being sufficiently ordered. In that case there is not even a coherent 
thing that we could call a social practice—there is no behavior recognizably patterned by 
shared norms. 
We have established that social practices must assign status to participants to 
operate. Social practices primarily assign status is by defining roles (or position), which 
include an associated status but also additional elements that explain how roles contribute 
to the practice. Strictly speaking this need not be part of the gatekeeping function; in 
principle a social practice could operate by directly assigning a bundled status or even by 
piecemeal norm application. Social practices employ roles because, among other things, this 
would be very inefficient and difficult to operate. My proposed meaning of LEGITIMACY frames 
legitimacy in terms of role occupation.  
Participants’ roles have already been central to my examples, including professor, 
student, parent, child, club member. Importantly, a role is more than a mere title for some 
status.6 The role can survive through changes in individual elements of status; this is not only 
a descriptive fact but a desirable feature of the role as a functional unit within a social 
practice. We can use our understanding of the role as a whole to critique the elements of 
status that it currently has, grounding claims for improvement by updating the status. We 
aren’t making a new role but making the role a better version of itself. The role takes on a 
life of its own. Whether professors should have the protections of tenure, and what exactly 
those protections should amount to, is a debate that relies on the fact that we understand the 
role of professor and the purpose of being a professor independently of what status elements 
the role currently includes in a particular practice. 
Although roles do not merely name a status, status is still central. The role is partly 
constituted by its status. Part of what it means to be a parent is to have certain 
responsibilities, the abandonment of which calls into question one’s position as a parent. In 
practices operating well, a role’s status will be defined so the role successfully does its part 
in the practice. Roles also standardly include ideals. Status mostly defines boundaries and 
possibilities but doesn’t tell us where to aim within those bounds. Ideals help us more 
robustly define the role beyond its boundaries and should direct the role to play its part as 
well. Parents have some responsibilities that act as minimum requirements; a good parent 
meets loftier ideals directed at successfully raising children. Various ideals of character and 
so on will tend to accumulate into our understanding of the role. 
                                                                
6 Similarly, my notion of a role is not Searle’s status function Y term. [Acknowledgement 
removed for anonymous review.] 
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We have reasons to expect that roles would become independently important. As 
Ritchie (2018) points out, roles reduce cognitive load, especially in more complex and larger 
social practices. Instead of needing to know the details of each element of status and the 
persons who have them, we can focus on the roles. Roles also reduce social load: when we 
set appropriate criteria on role occupancy, we can trust that role-occupants will play their 
part without needing to base our trust on our personal familiarity with particular 
participants or on a norm-by-norm basis. This is also important for the persistence of well-
functioning social practices across time and through changes of membership. Roles are an 
indispensable and independent part of social practices. 
Social practices successfully coordinate behavior when participants take up roles and 
conform their actions to the norms and ideals associated with the roles. The differentiation 
between roles and role occupants is crucial, even at the most basic level of distinguishing 
participants from non-participants. If we treat non-participants as participants or if we treat 
one role occupant as if they occupied a different role, the social practice will not be able to 
function. To be clear, then, what I am calling gatekeeping is not only distinguishing between 
insiders and outsiders but occupying different internal positions. Social practices require a 
way to identify role occupants and thereby get behavior to align with the role-associated 
status. 
 
2. Connecting to Legitimacy 
 
Cast at this level of generality, it is clear that social practices perform the gatekeeping 
function in a wide variety of ways. More formalized and codified practices, for example 
organizations, will often have explicit identifiers of role occupancy, for example records, 
contracts, and identification badges. My claim is that legitimacy discourses also, not solely, 
perform the gatekeeping function. Recall that we are setting aside the question of how social 
practices get people to conform to their norms. This is independent from however the 
gatekeeping function is performed. If nobody cares (or is forced to care) about the practice, 
they will not conform their behavior to the role-associated normative status identified by the 
gatekeeper, whether that is done by engaging in a discourse or carrying a badge. 
 It is clear that applying certain concepts actually performs the gatekeeping function. 
On campus, students will often learn that I am a professor because they are present when 
another student calls me professor. I don’t need my identification card in that case, let alone 
my employment contract; a shared PROFESSOR discourse does gatekeeping work in that 
context. Applying the title identifies me as occupying that role and structures how others 
who accept the discourse treat me. The interesting question is not whether employing a 
concept can serve the gatekeeping question. With LEGITIMACY in mind, the interesting 
question is why there should be an additional and apparently very general concept that 
serves this function across social practices. If PROFESSOR already does this work on campus, 
what does it add to ask whether someone is a legitimate professor? 
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  There are many contexts in which a community would employ a more general 
concept to perform the gatekeeping function. The more general gatekeeping concept is 
helpful when there is some sense that the entity occupies the role (they’re a professor) but 
also some question of whether they meet some associated but more stringent standards. 
There is a divergence in standards for role occupancy that allows for this question to be 
sensible. The divergence leads to disagreement and thus the utility of a more general 
gatekeeping concept that allows us to better ask and answer the question of role occupation. 
When we see that the conditions for divergence in standards are common, indeed pervasive, 
then we see why a more general gatekeeping concept is helpful. We should expect such 
persistent disagreement because role occupancy often confers some advantages, while 
meeting the conditions for occupying the role involves some costs, so there are incentives to 
occupy the role without meeting the conditions.  
 First, consider three contexts in which disagreement will arise with respect to 
codified practices like the university or other legally instituted organizations. The most 
obvious case is where an entity occupies a role as a matter of fact but there is some question 
as to whether they gained the role fraudulently according to the codified standards. Brian 
Kemp is the current governor of Georgia but his opponent Stacey Abrams and many 
commentators question his legitimacy as governor because they questioned whether the 
election was fairly run. Someone who appeals to the fact that he was sworn into office is 
missing the point of the inquiry; given the purposes of elections, governing, and so on, 
someone should only have the status of governor under certain strict conditions that the 
practice details. Sometimes the office can be attained without the conditions being met. 
 This straightforwardly points to another context of disagreement. Once roles, 
standards, and so forth have been codified, they also become static to some degree. As 
participants engage in the practice, though, they will be interested in how the practice should 
improve, perhaps for example by better pursuing its constitutive aims. This creates the space 
for a more normative, critical discourse surrounding role occupants that abjures the current 
descriptive elements of the practice precisely because those elements are the subject of 
critique. It may be uncontested that the governor gained the office according to the relevant 
procedures but if they use the office in ways that contradict the point of the practice or the 
purpose of the role, or if the extant selection procedures undermine that purpose, then the 
question of their legitimate occupancy arises. If Kemp won under current election law but 
that law unjustly restricts voting rights, then he may be illegitimate despite occupying the 
role by following extant procedures. We may decide that the occupant is illegitimate and 
decline to treat them according to their role’s status while we pursue ejection procedures.  
 Relatedly, social practices often embed. It is common for fans to debate whether a 
college football win, or season champion, is legitimate. The question here isn’t whether the 
win was a win according to the rules (although that question can also be raised in the context 
of cheating, as above). The question is whether the win meets further, more robust 
conditions that show the win to be indicative or constitutive of superior skill. If the point of 
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the season is to recognize the best team, then often merely counting formal wins won’t do 
because of confounding issues like strength of schedule, opponents’ injury status, and so on. 
The codified practice generates a subpractice that shares a constitutive goal but by necessity 
cannot use the same language of role occupancy. Any practice can generate subpractices in 
this way (including subpractices themselves); adding new terms for each role in each 
subpractice would be confusing, given the pervasiveness of practices, but is also unnecessary 
if we have the more general gatekeeping concept.  
 Distinct practices often use the same term for a role because the practices are related; 
they may also share conditions such that it is obvious that the entity occupies one role but 
not another. Consider the notion of a legitimate child. The role ‘child’ occurs in many distinct 
but overlapping social practices. The duke’s daughter whose mother is not the duke’s wife is 
his child in a biological sense but is not a legitimate child in that archaic sense connected to 
the marital status of her parents and related to certain practices of inheritance. She’s his 
child, but is she legitimate? The practices share the term so the term’s discourse can’t serve 
the gatekeeping function very well. The more general concept allows us to retain the specific 
conceptual overlap but identify that we have questions about normative status within the 
more narrow practice, in this case involving inheritance rather than biology. 
 Disagreement also arises much more easily and commonly in uncodified practices. 
Lack of codification can include all features of the practice, including the procedures for 
occupying the role, what norms and ideals attach to the role, how to assess role occupancy 
or role performance, what ousting would look like, who the relevant participants to make 
these judgments are, the purpose of the role in the practice, the relations between roles, the 
overall goal and nature of the practice, and so on. When these features are not codified, 
asking whether an entity occupies a role leads to problems of misidentification or 
disagreement over identification of role occupancy in a way that is mostly not salient with 
codification. (Indeed, I take codification to be largely about overcoming such obstacles.)  
 If these disagreements occur only by asking whether an entity occupies the role, they 
take on a descriptive appearance. In fact, however, these disagreements are often normative: 
they are not about what the practice is but what it should and could be (Plunkett 2015). The 
features that can be uncodified, listed above, can also be vague and contested: there’s no 
obvious true answer about what the conditions are for occupying a role or what those 
conditions should be, given contestation about the goals of the practice itself, how the roles 
function together, and so forth. So, these debates are often better framed (though not 
necessarily resolved) in a more obviously normative manner, which the more general 
concept enables. Applying the more general gatekeeping concept helps clarify that the 
question is not just whether they have the title but whether they are due the treatment the 
associated normative status demands. 
These contexts are not exhaustive. If role occupancy can be easily faked, for example, 
then the opportunity for disagreement arises. However, I take my point to have been made. 
Social practices need the gatekeeping function to be performed and concepts can be used to 
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raise and debate the question of role occupancy. Specific role concepts can perform this 
function but so can more general concepts. The more general gatekeeping concept is 
especially useful when disagreement about standards for role occupancy arises, as it often 
does, and so directly using the title disguises the underlying dispute and undermines the 
point of engaging in a critical inquiry.  
As the above examples show, LEGITIMACY is a plausible candidate for the concept that 
serves the general gatekeeping function. Here, then, is the gatekeeping account of LEGITIMACY. 
When we ask whether an entity legitimate or illegitimate, we are concerned with whether it 
counts as occupying some role in a social practice. To be legitimate is to occupy a role within 
a social practice and therefore have, among other things, the status associated with that role. 
Consequently, to say that A is legitimate is always to implicitly say that A is a legitimate x, 
where x picks out a role within a social practice (as opposed, for example, to a natural kind): 
‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ are attributive, not predicative, adjectives (Geach 1956). An 
entity cannot be legitimate simpliciter—although we can make sense of such assessments 
when the entity essentially occupies a role or the context makes the relevant role clear.  
As gatekeepers, legitimacy assessments can perform at least three different functions. 
The one I’ve emphasized so far is to distinguish potential from actual role-occupants, or 
between fake and genuine participants. This contrast between fake and genuine is often 
characteristic of legitimacy judgments and can arise with respect to any entity in a practice, 
including an object that has an associated status in the practice. A legitimate iPhone is a 
product of the company Apple; an illegitimate iPhone looks like the real product but is not 
produced by Apple and so is a fake, a knock-off. The role in question is being a certain product 
of an organization, which confers a status that, for example, entitles the owner to assistance 
from Apple under certain conditions. The knock-off might include a copy of the iPhone 
warranty but Apple isn’t required to cover the knock-off precisely because it is illegitimate 
so does not have the relevant status.  
Another function is to clearly distinguish the more restricted question of which 
entities count in the practice from more robust assessments. Gatekeeping is about entry, not 
excellence.7 A legitimate argument is not necessarily valid or sound but is the appropriate 
object of assessment in argument terms. The social practice is about making claims in a 
certain manner. To be a legitimate argument in this context is to be a participant in the 
practice of attempting to make claims in that manner and being evaluated according to the 
relevant standards for making such claims. An invalid, unsound argument is still an 
argument, just a bad one.8 An illegitimate argument doesn’t even get into the game of being 
                                                                
7 Though, as noted above, to better focus on excellence we might engage in a subpractice that 
sets more stringent standards of entry for consideration. 
8 An implication is that you can implicitly legitimate something by critiquing it according to 
role-specific standards; even if your critique is correct, you presuppose that it meets the 
entry requirements on the role because it is an appropriate subject of the higher role 
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assessed on grounds of validity or soundness; it does not pass the entry gate. An ad hominem 
claim doesn’t need to be shown to be false because that would treat it as an argument, which 
it is not. It is an illegitimate argument because it is an attack.  
Similarly, a legitimate question deserves serious consideration and some kind of 
response, if not a full answer. That’s the practice the utterance is trying to enter. It can be an 
illegitimate question despite being a question as a matter of linguistic form and use. An 
illegitimate question does not get into the question game: it is not due serious consideration 
or response. This could be because of the content of the question, the context of utterance, 
the nature of the speaker or her audience, or much else. Something rules out illegitimate 
questions from consideration; the assessment is not about quality but aptness. 
Finally, a general gatekeeping concept enables us to more clearly raise the possibility 
of meta-gatekeeping.9 We already noted that it allows us to ask not only whether an entity 
meets the extant standards for role occupation but what those standards could and should 
be. We may also ask what standards we have for standards, or how we solve the higher-order 
debates about standards. This question is pressing given the pervasiveness of social 
practices and roles in our lives. It would be incredibly costly to relearn and renegotiate 
individual gatekeeping discourses for each one; better if we can share a meta-gatekeeping 
discourse.  
 In fact, I think most meta-gatekeeping in our everyday lives is not done by legitimacy 
discourses but by legality (cf. Habermas 1996).10 The state sets minimum standards for 
various kinds of social entities to receive the support, or at least the non-interference, of the 
public. Legal gatekeeping is done by more than just a shared discourse of LEGAL, of course: 
the state notably literally polices the boundaries of legality, using coercive force, threats, and 
shared sentiment to disable and prevent illegal entities. Instead of needing each citizen to 
know and participate in the development of standards for what sorts of speech we should 
allow in the public sphere, and what kinds of contract, and which grocery stores, and what 
land use rules, we have a higher-order practice that precisely establishes and enforces 
standards for participating in our public, including standards for meta-gatekeeping itself. 
Subpractices and their associated gatekeeping practices are then relevant, enabling as 
individuals and different kinds of communities to apply their own standards and choose 
among the legal options.  
  
3. Political Legitimacy 
 
                                                                
standards it doesn’t meet. 
9 Here I’m inspired by Buchanan’s (2013) notion of metacoordination. 
10 Among other differences, my proposal is more ecumenical; Habermas’ analysis rests on 
the details of his wide-ranging theory of communicative action. [Acknowledgement removed 
for anonymous review.] 
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It will help to see how my proposed understanding applies to political legitimacy. First, the 
contrast between LEGITIMACY and JUSTICE is explained very well if the two perform different 
functions in political social practices; the former performs a gatekeeping function while the 
latter performs the function of purpose or ideal. Second, debates about political legitimacy 
are illuminated when understood in terms of debates about the role that particular 
institutions should play and the nature of the social practices they inhabit.  
Some important ways in which LEGITIMACY differs from JUSTICE are explained by the 
distinct functions they perform in the context of the state. Rawls (2005, 428) notes that 
“legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice and imposes weaker constraints.” Similarly, “A 
significant aspect of the idea of legitimacy is that it allows a certain leeway in how well 
sovereigns may rule and how far they may be tolerated” (Rawls 2005, 427). Rawls’ political 
turn arises from his recognition that there will be reasonable disagreement about his theory 
of justice and that legitimacy serves a different function (Langvatn 2016). Freeman (2007, 
325) shows that for Rawls, LEGITIMACY is “especially important under non-ideal conditions.”  
As the gatekeeper, LEGITIMACY concerns itself with minimal standards for counting as 
a state and deserving a certain status; by contrast, states are striving towards and may not 
reach JUSTICE as a regulative ideal. We need states to function even under radically non-ideal 
conditions and even when they are rather profoundly unjust—taking seriously the costs to 
human well-being if we fall out of organized political community. So LEGITIMACY discourses 
will need to enable states under non-ideal conditions by holding states to standards that are 
achievable under those conditions. As such they will be weaker conditions than the 
requirements of justice and they will account for more radical disagreement. Under non-
ideal conditions, the focus will often shift to legitimacy rather than justice precisely because 
the more stringent standards are, for the moment, out of reach. State legitimacy is about the 
core functionality of states because LEGITIMACY performs the gatekeeping function. A well-
functioning state might go far beyond legitimacy and serve functions that a weaker or less 
reliable state should not.  
Some of the debates about political legitimacy are clarified when understood as 
concerning the nature of the social practice that states are embedded in and their role in that 
practice. Williams and Rawls understand the relevant social practice differently. Williams 
(2005, 3) proposes that the Hobbesian role of the state is “the securing of order, protection, 
safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation.” In contrast, Rawls (2005, 3) asks what terms 
should be set on a system of fair cooperation among free and equal participants. Both focus 
on cooperation but Rawls takes for granted certain stipulations that shape the rest of his 
theory. Williams’ realism forces him to address political realities that Rawls ignores because 
they take themselves to be addressing different social practices altogether. Of course they 
disagree about the standards of legitimacy and what claims legitimate states have. 
Legitimacy standards can only be drawn from some understanding of the embedding social 
practice and how the entity’s role fits into that broader picture. 
Rawls’ theory looks notoriously different when he shifts to international relations. In 
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my view, this difference is explained by the fact that he is considering the state in a new 
practice: as a participant in the Society of Peoples rather than as the determinant of the terms 
of cooperation for individuals. As Rawls (1999, 83) notes, “How peoples treat each other and 
how they treat their own members are, it is important to recognize, two different things.” 
The differences between the practices, including the stakes, the level of disagreements, 
history, their respective constitutive purposes, and much else, lead him to weaken the 
standards for participation. If I am right about LEGITIMACY serving the gatekeeping role within 
particular social practices, we have an explanation (if not a justification) of this shift. Rawls 
does not frame his inquiry as concerning legitimacy but it is clearly about gatekeeping the 
practice of international relations by setting minimum standards for peoples to meet in 
order to count as full participants. From my perspective, the difficulty is that the state plays 
different roles in different practices but we want to synthesize the different legitimacy 
assessment we make of the state.  
Political legitimacy for institutions other than the state, for example supranational 
institutions like the European Union or international law, looks very different because the 
social practice is also different. Philosophers are aware of these differences and are 
attempting to work out their implications; if international courts operate in a voluntary, 
treaty-based practice, then the standards of legitimacy are very different than if they operate 
in a compulsory or coercive practice (Christiano 2019). The nature of these issues is clarified 
with a unified background theory of LEGITIMACY as performing the gatekeeping function for 
social practices. 
Some of the nuances of these debates also fit my proposal well. Christiano’s 
discussion, for example, is partly about how international courts are in a different practice 
than domestic courts. But in both cases, courts play similar roles: they are only courts 
because they adjudicate cases, for example. Further, as Christiano emphasizes, the 
international context is still a political context. This means that some features of domestic 
court legitimacy will be applicable to international court legitimacy. Concerns about rule of 
law, especially consistency across cases, motivate Christiano’s investigation into whether the 
limitations on the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction undermine its legitimacy.  
I argued above that LEGITIMACY is best understood as concerning role occupation 
rather than the direct assignment of status. This is a case where we see that in practice. The 
social role of a court can be partly understood independently of any specific social practice. 
Simultaneously, the details of a court’s particular practice also matter for its legitimacy 
because it has to serve some purpose in that social practice and the pursuit of that practice’s 
constitutive aims. And as with states, the issue is whether the court should have the basic 
status of a court: the normative powers to decisively adjudicate cases for parties. Christiano 
notes many ways that the ICC is non-ideal but the question is whether the problems of 
jurisdiction matter for its ability to conduct itself as a court at all. The question of the ICC’s 
legitimacy is an entry-level, gatekeeping question that is relative to the practice it occupies a 
role within but informed by courts’ functions more generally. 
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Finally, many discussions of political legitimacy focus on moral legitimacy. There is 
an obvious sense in which such questions could be about a social practice in the sense of the 
positive morality of a particular social group. But most of the time, these discussions are 
asking about morality in a more normative manner. This is still consistent with my view. We 
are asking whether some entity meets the standards drawn from our best understanding of, 
or the truth about, morality as a distinct normative domain; if the entity meets the standards, 
then it has the associated moral status and stands in certain moral relationships with others. 
We may attempt to answer these questions from the perspective of the practice of morality 
in its best form, even if that is not its currently accepted form in some specified group. This 
is the set of norms that we think should pattern our behavior even if does not now, and so 
we can use such norms in our legitimacy assessments as well. 
  
4. Alternatives 
 
In this final section I address two potential alternatives to my proposal. It has been suggested 
to me that LEGITIMACY means something thin like JUSTIFICATION or VALIDITY. (As far as I know, 
nobody has attempted to articulate a distinct function for LEGITIMACY in the way I have here.) 
Perhaps to say that A is legitimate is to say that A is justified, according to some practice-
relative standard. This could explain why LEGITIMACY performs the gatekeeping function but 
why it is also coherently in other ways. This proposal also seems to fit theories of state 
legitimacy that focus on the question of whether or not state coercion is justified.  
A possible virtue of the alternative proposal is better fit with ordinary usage. I’m not 
sure that this is the case and would need to see evidence to that effect; more importantly, my 
explicitly revisionary proposal only requires sufficient fit with ordinary usage to ensure I am 
not changing the topic. Since conceptual engineering is not merely descriptive, better 
degrees of fit with ordinary usage are less important than other criteria.  
There is no doubt that JUSTIFICATION serves some important function. The problem 
here is not that LEGITIMACY couldn’t serve that function but that the alternative proposal 
renders LEGITIMACY redundant. This makes our language less useful if there is a function for 
LEGITIMACY that JUSTIFICATION cannot serve well. Only if all legitimacy language can be 
coherently understood in terms of justification would it make sense to abandon LEGITIMACY 
because it adds nothing except confusion. But it appears to me that JUSTIFICATION does not fit 
the question of social role occupation very well. 
Justification is a property of intentional (though not necessarily intended) actions. It’s 
a category mistake to claim that a hurricane was either justified or unjustified. When we ask 
whether an entity counts as occupying a role, we are not asking about something they have 
done, we are asking about what they are or, more accurately, what relationships they stand 
in to others. And recall that this assessment also applies to objects. Justification doesn’t 
capture any of this well. 
It’s true that whether or not an entity has the status associated with the role is 
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relevant to many questions of justification. If the status includes some obligations, then the 
role-occupant is not justified in acting any other way. On the other hand, many aspects of 
standing are orthogonal to justification. If the status includes a power, the power-holder can 
exercise the power in unjustified ways. Powers confer a normative ability but do not 
guarantee that exercising it is always justified. We often ask the legitimacy question first 
precisely so that we know how to answer questions of justification. 
Perhaps the issue could be whether we are justified in treating entities as role-
occupants. But this is simply distinct from whether they are role-occupants and these 
questions come apart. In the case of illegitimate social practices, we are unjustified in 
treating those entities that are role-occupants from a perspective internal to the practice in 
the ways that their status would demand.11 In the mob, nobody is all-things-considered 
justified in obeying the boss because his commands entail egregiously wronging others, even 
though it is true that he is the legitimate boss, a role as defined within the practice and that 
includes practice-relative authority.  
Perhaps the justification is about actors within the practice assigning some role and 
whether or not such role-assignment is justified. This kind of act can be justified or 
unjustified; for example, an immigration judge can justifiably or unjustifiably decide that 
some petitioner counts as a refugee. But most role-assignment does not happen this way. 
Most social practices do not explicitly define roles and criteria in the way that law does. Even 
in law most roles are assigned implicitly and by default, not as a matter of explicit choice. 
Similar concerns apply to the question of being justified in accepting a role. Although related 
in many important ways, a justification discourse is a poor fit for questions about the 
occupancy of a social role and the possession of normative status. 
One source of the concern that LEGITIMACY amounts to JUSTIFICATION is the literature on 
political legitimacy discussed above. It is relatively common to cast questions of political 
legitimacy in terms of justification. Kolodny (2014: 309) sets a familiar tone according to 
which the question of legitimacy is whether political decisions are ‘roughly, permissible to 
implement’. Pettit (2019: 7) similarly holds that ‘the problem of legitimacy is that of morally 
justifying the way a state exercises monopoly power’. I agree that justification is central to 
state legitimacy but it is a poor fit for what state legitimacy means. Both Kolodny and Pettit, 
among others, slide between the normative status that a state has and the justification of 
particular exercises of state power. These are distinct, as both implicitly recognize. A 
legitimate state can act unjustifiably.  
                                                                
11 This is because the social practice in which social practices embed is something like shared 
social life very broadly, where the purpose of social practices is to coordinate behavior and 
enable the pursuit of various kinds of value, so a social practice can be illegitimate when it is 
harmful in the right ways. In such a case, it doesn’t have the standing a legitimate social 
practice possesses: that the normative status it constitutively assigns via roles have some 
normative weight that participants and others must account for when acting. 
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Pettit concludes that state legitimacy rules out radical regime change as a route for 
political change. This is the right sort of status, ascribed to the state as a whole, and is simply 
different from whether the state is exercising its power well. State legitimacy and the 
justified exercise of political power are of course connected due to the nature of the state 
itself, the powers it has and the roles it plays. As Peter (2013: 599) notes, ‘At the core of 
political liberalism is the claim that political institutions must be publicly justified or 
justifiable to be legitimate’. Weithman (2019: 56-7) interprets Rawls as making this 
connection with the view that every ordinary exercise of political power simultaneously 
implicates the question of the existence and standing of the political collective. Although 
related, political legitimacy and justifying exercises of power are not the same and reducing 
one to the other does not help us think through the issues.  
Clarity on LEGITIMACY would help us address this and other problems in the literature 
on political legitimacy. For example, what is the relationship between the legitimacy of a 
constitution, government, state, legislative body, legislation, judicial decision, and parking 
ticket? They seem related—and perhaps connected to the legitimacy of supranational or 
local institutions as well—but it is common to mention their potential relation without even 
attempting to explain them. My proposal will not give an easy answer to their relation, which 
is surely complicated. It simply helps us understand what questions we are asking. 
Another possibility is that LEGITIMACY is about valid claims, and so perhaps is the same 
as VALIDITY. I agree that the idea of a valid claim is at the core of legitimacy; on my construal, 
that is captured by the status that legitimate entities attain as occupants of their role. Often 
the fact that an entity is legitimate means that it has some valid claims that an illegitimate 
entity does not.  
The problem with thinking that LEGITIMACY is merely VALIDITY is that it doesn’t tell us 
what subset of a legitimate entity’s claims are valid. Legitimacy cannot mean that the 
legitimate entity’s claims are all valid. A legitimate argument is not necessarily sound, as 
noted above, and a legitimate state’s laws are not necessarily just. We need some way of 
distinguishing which claims legitimacy makes valid (if we want to put it this way). An 
understanding of LEGITIMACY that equates it to VALIDITY or the standing to make valid claims 
cannot do this. Of course, my proposal makes a relevant distinction: a legitimate entity 
counts as occupying a role in a social practice, so has some status and claims that follow from 
the status will be valid within the practice.  
Further, in the practices I mentioned above, we often employ stronger normative 
assessments precisely to entitle the entity to a broader range of claim-making. A sound 
argument entails further claims beyond legitimacy, as does the most incisive question or a 
fully just state. LEGITIMACY plays the gatekeeping role of identifying those entities that count 
as role occupants. Other normative evaluations direct the role-occupants to even better 
performance of their role, so in many cases gives them the standing to make a broader set of 
valid claims. VALIDITY is not a good fit with the gatekeeping function or the question of role-
occupation and does not seem to match with how we use LEGITIMACY. There may be other 
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plausible contenders for the conceptual function that I’ve articulated. However, they are not 
apparent to me, presumably partly because LEGITIMACY is undertheorized so nearby 
possibilities have not been identified and defended. 
In sum, I proposed that LEGITIMACY is our general gatekeeping concept. Using 
LEGITIMACY discourses enables social practices by serving this function. From this we get a 
more precise understanding of LEGITIMACY: an entity is legitimate when it counts as occupying 
a particular role within some social practice and has the associated status. I showed how this 
proposal fits with many commonsense usages of LEGITIMACY. Finally, I argued that my 
proposal fits with the well-developed literature on political legitimacy. Using LEGITIMACY in 
the way I proposed would clarify debates over various legitimacy proposals and could also 
improve our social practices by articulating the gatekeeping function and performing it well. 
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